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I. INTRODUCTION
Michael Anthony Bullard worked as an at-will employee for the Bigelow
Holding Company: a company whose assets include rental properties in the Las
Vegas area and whose practices included "strong evidence"'' of discriminatory2
measures. Bullard probably knew of his employer's biases against African-
Americans and he may have even been a company agent in their application.
One day while at work in the Bigelow office, Bullard heard that the com-
pany intended to remove three African-American males from one of its proper-
ties by way of physical beatings.4  Disapproving of Bigelow's treatment of Af-
rican-Americans, and its proposed violent eviction of them, Bullard protested to
his coworker Carol Swenson, "Blacks have rights, too."5 A few minutes fol-
lowing Bullard's remark, Swenson spoke with her supervisor, Donna Dallman,
who immediately approached Bullard, grabbed the piece of paper upon which
he was writing and asked him, "What's your fucking problem?"6 He answered
that he didn't have a problem, to which Dallman responded by calling him a
"fucking nigger lover," telling him to get his "fucking ass out of here," and pro-
claiming, "I don't want you working for me anymore."
7
* Charter class member of the William S. Boyd School of Law, University Nevada Las Vegas
whose anticipated graduation date is May 2001. My wife's personal support made this pro-
ject, and so much else, a reality; thank you, Jenifer. My professor's effective teaching and
inspirational guidance introduced me to employment issues and taught me how to write about
them; thank you, Ann C. McGinley. My colleagues' citation expertise gave this project
technical polish; thank you Pete Romleski, Jeani Wiethop, David Schubert, and Gary Ash-
man.
1 Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630, 632 (Nev. 1995).
2 Id. at 633. Significantly regarding the known discrimination at the company, the Nevada
Supreme Court stated, "It could be inferred from the evidence in this case that the Bigelow
company had in fact adopted a rental policy of discriminating against African-Americans. It
has been claimed that the agents of Bigelow were instructed to use deception and subterfuge
to prevent African-Americans from becoming tenants in Bigelow rentals."
3id.
4Id.
I/d. at 632.
6Id. at 638.
71d.
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Bullard subsequently filed suit against Bigelow. 8 He sought to recover
judgment based on a tortious discharge claim alleging that the company had
terminated his employment because of his objection to the employer's known
racial policies and practices. 9 Consequently, the district court rendered judg-
ment in Bullard's favor pursuant to a jury verdict. 10  The Nevada Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's decision holding that Bullard failed to establish
a prima facie case of tortious discharge, because the at-will doctrine permits an
employer to terminate employment for any or no reason, even if that reason is
"to discharge [an] employee for his perceived sympathy toward African-
Americans.
This comment will examine the Nevada Supreme Court's 1995 decision in
Bigelow v. Bullard.12 The analysis will begin by considering the at-will em-
ployment doctrine and continue by examining the general theories under which
an employee may bring a claim of wrongful termination against the employer,
specifically theories of contract and public policy. The focus will then turn to
Nevada's interpretation and consequent understanding of the public policy ex-
ception in Bigelow.13 The paper will conclude with a discussion of the court's
decision by addressing how the court should have interpreted the public policy
exception to the at will doctrine in light of similar cases outside of Nevada.
II. THE COMING OF AT-WILL
Historically, English laws concerned themselves with the duration of ser-
vice relationships. Specifically, the laws addressed how soon a party in the re-
lationship should receive or provide notice of the relationship's termination and
how long the relationship should endure in the absence of a termination date.
14
Regarding the issue of notice, the courts decided that reasonable notice would
8 Id. at 630. In addition to Bullard's claim of tortious discharge, two other employees filed
claims against Bigelow. Ricky Hammer filed a claim of tortious discharge and wrongful
eviction and Susan Vaughan filed a claim for assault and battery. Although the plaintiffs
joined their claims against their former employer, only Bullard's claim of tortious discharge
linked his termination to Bigelow's alleged discriminatory practices. Bullard believes that his
employment discharge resulted from his statement "Blacks have rights, too." The Nevada
Supreme Court quickly dismissed Hammer's tortious discharge claim, because the company
asserts that Hammer's termination resulted from his unsatisfactory work performance. The
court commented that Bigelow could have fired Hammer, an at-will employee, for any rea-
son. The court further noted that Hammer's dismissal lacked any association to the com-
pany's racially discriminatory policies. Thus, this comment treats only Bullard's tortious
discharge claim to propose expanding the public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine.
9 Id. at 631.
10 Id. at 630.
"ld. at 634.
12901 P.2d 630 (Nev. 1995).
13 Supra note7. This comment will address only the employer's discharge of Bullard.
14 Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule. 20 AM.J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 119 (1976).
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suffice to terminate the service relationship. 15 Regarding the issue of a rela-
tionship's unspecified termination date, Sir William Blackstone stated:
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes
it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant
shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the
respective season, as well when there is work to be done as when there is not. 6
English law considered the service relationship between the master and
servant as a domestic, and even familial, one. 17 However, the English law's
domesticity had little application in late nineteenth-century United States as so-
ciety's industry gave way to widespread commercialism. In contrast to the Eng-
lish law of master and servant, the American Rule, which Horace Wood au-
thored in 1877, provided, ".... a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out to be a yearly hiring, the
burden is upon him to establish it by proof."'
'8
The popularity and strength of Wood's treatise of the employment relation-
ship had quickly materialized as the United States' mainstream employment
doctrine. Today, and nearly automatically, it applies in the absence of an em-
ployer's altemative discharge policy and dictates that an employment contract
of indefinite duration be terminable at the will of either party. It embodies the
principle that employers in the United States are free to terminate workers for
any nondiscriminatory reason and thus, subject to statutory restrictions, an em-
ployer's justification to terminate the employment of a worker has no legal rele-
vance.19  The at-will terminable employment relationship still flourishes in
employment contracts throughout the country, and of specific interest, in the
15 Id. at 119. Also Feinman addresses the notion of what is reasonable. He writes, "What con-
stituted reasonable notice was a question of fact to be decided anew in each case, but certain
conventions grew up. Domestic servants, who presumably no longer needed the benefit of
the seasons, could be given a month's notice. Other types of employees could also be given
a month's notice; three months was another common term, although some special cases re-
quired six or even twelve months' notice. Although notice was a separate question in each
case, the custom of the trade was often determinative."
16 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries. 410 (1765).
17 Id. Additionally, Blackstone discusses the "three great relations in private life." He sug-
gests that they are a) master and servant, b) husband and wife, and c) parent and child. These
relations imply a hierarchical power structure, but nevertheless they connote a kind of inti-
macy and personal connection between the relation's two parts.
18 Horace G. Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master & Servant § 134 at 272 (John D. Par-
son, Jr., 1877). See also Gregory Mark Munson, A Straitjacket for Employment At- Will: Rec-
ognizing Breach of Implied Contract Actions for Wrongful Demotion, 50 VAND. L. REV.
1557, 1580 (1997); Feinman, supra note 15.
19 Khan, Steven C.. Personnel Director's Legal Guide, 2nd ed., Warren, Gorham &Lambert,
Inc., Boston, Massachusetts, 1990, at 7.01. The American Rule reacted against the English
Rule, which sought to prohibit employers from discharging employees unless for a reason-
able and sufficient cause. Most U.S. jurisdictions had abandoned the English Rule by the late
1800s, reasoning that restrictions on terminating employment were inconsistent with the lais-
sez-faire philosophy then prevalent in the United States.
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state of Nevada.
20
The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the at-will employment doc-
trine consistent with the American Rule. That is, the court has held that an em-
ployer may terminate the employment of an at-will employee at any time for
any reason or for no reason at all, and that an employer may dismiss an at-will• 21
employee even on a mere whim. Furthermore, the court has held that em-
ployment contracts are ordinarily and presumably contracts that are terminable
at-will.
22
The at-will employment doctrine nevertheless is not impenetrable. Holes in
the doctrine began to develop because of Congress' chipping away at it to find
and impose limitations on the at-will employment relationship. For example,
Congress prohibited employment termination against civil service employees
without cause and it prohibited discrimination against employees for their union
activity.23 Congress further broke through the doctrine's walls in 1964 when it
prohibited employment discrimination based on race, sex, religion, age, and
impairment or handicap.24 However, despite occasional congressional interven-
tion, the doctrine has given considerable power to employers who have abused
it to terminate wrongfully the American worker.
A terminated at-will employee may bring a wrongful discharge claim
against the employer under theories of contract or public policy.2 5 In the pre-
20 Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent
National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1493 (1996). Commenting on the status
quo of the at-will employment doctrine, McGinley notes that it "thrives" and makes specific
reference to the Nevada Supreme Court's decision in Bigelow as an egregious example of the
victory of the employment at-will doctrine over sanity.
21 Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 633 (Nev. 1995).
22 D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 211 (Nev. 1991).
23 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994)
24 Many congressional limitations on the employment at-will doctrine exist and among them
are:
a) Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 USCS § 1447 (1998).
b) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 USCS § 621 (1998).
c) Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 USCS § 1981
d) Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USCS § 12101 (1996).
e) Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 USCS § 1101 (1998).
f) Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 USCS § 1101
g) Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 USCS § 141 (1996).
h) Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938, 29 USCS § 201 (1998).
i) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 5 USCS § 5108 (1998).
25 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer
Selflnterest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 397 (1989). Of particular note, Perrit states, "The
most significant employment law development in the last quarter of the 2 0th century has been
the erosion of the employment-at-will rule and the recognition of a family of common law
rights protecting individual employees against wrongful dismissal. Under these wrongful
dismissal doctrines, terminated employees may be able to recover damages when they can
show that their terminations violated employer promises, jeopardized clear public policies,
or, sometimes, when the terminations did not comport with good faith and fair dealing. The
wrongful dismissal common law doctrines have substantially eroded the operation of the em-
ployment-at-will rule."
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sent case of Bigelow, Bullard pursued his claim of wrongful discharge against
the Bigelow Holding Company under a theory of public policy and not one of
contract. Nevertheless, contract theory warrants a brief discussion in the con-
text of wrongful termination even though the at-will doctrine signifies only a
rebuttable presumption to a breach of contract. The discussion will address spe-
cifically 1) oral contracts, 2) the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, and 3) personnel manuals as binding contractual obligations. 2 6
III. CONTRACT THEORY
A. Oral Contracts
Oral contracts require the courts to look beyond the express terms of em-
ployment to understand, honor, and execute the parties' intent. For example, in
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., Wayne Pugh brought a wrongful termination action
against his employ'er for violating an implied promise that it would not act arbi-
trarily with him. Early on in his employment, the then president and general
manager of the company frequently assured Pugh, "If you are loyal to See's and
do a good job, your future is secure." 28 Pugh's loyalty and performance mer-
ited promotions, consequently elevating his position from dishwasher to com-
pany vice president and member of the board of directors without a single for-
mal or written criticism of his work.29 Nevertheless, after his 32 years with the
company, See's terminated his employment.
30
The court held that Pugh had demonstrated a prima facie case of wrongful
termination in violation of an implied promise in contract.3 1 The court noted
that the contract implied a promise to Pugh that See's would not act arbitrarily
in dealing with him as evidenced by the "totality of [the] parties' relation-
ship." 32 The court held that a contract of employment is terminable only for
good cause if independent consideration supported it, or that the employer and
the employee agreed, either expressl or impliedly, that the employee's termi-
nation could only be for good cause.
The court reasoned that the general rule requiring independent considera-
26 See Khan, supra note 18. Contract theory in the specific context of employment contracts
may consist of several sub-theories. In addition to oral contracts, the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and personnel manuals as binding contractual obligations, the
employment relationship may consider written contracts, independent consideration, and
promissory or equitable estoppel.
27 116 CA. App. 3d 311 (1st Dist.)
28 Id. at 919.
29 id.
301d. at 918.
"' Id. at 927.
32 Id.
" Id. at 925.
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tion is a rule of construction, and not of substance. 34 Consequently, a contract
for permanent employment, whether or not the contract is based upon some
consideration other than the employee's services, cannot be terminated at the
will of the employer if the contract contains an express or implied condition to
the contrary. Furthermore, the court discovered the existence of an implied
promise by considering several factors. Among these were "personnel policies
or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service, actions or
communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employ-
ment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged."
36
Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that employment contracts
are presumably at will. 37 Thus, an employer "may expressly or impliedly agree
with an employee that employment is to be for an indefinite term and may be
terminated only for cause or only in accordance with established polices or pro-
cedures."'38 This agreement creates a contract of continued employment that anemployee can enforce according to its terms. 39
B. Implied Covenant of Good Faith
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing obligates both the em-
ployer and the employee to execute the employment contract in good faith and
it imposes a duty upon each of them to deal fairly with one another.4 0 At the
very least, the covenant demands that the employer and employee refrain from
acting in bad faith. For example, in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., Or-
ville Fortune sought to recover sales bonuses from sales he made prior to his
employment termination.4 1 Fortune had worked for National Cash Register Co.
as a sales person and had successfully secured a large sale from which he would
earn a commission. 42 The sale entitled him to a bonus, seventy-five percent of
which the company paid prior to terminating its employment relationship with
34 See also Khan, supra note 18. Several states have found that the presumption of at-will
employment is rebutted where the employee has given consideration beyond that normally
provided to an employer. Typically, these cases involve a plaintiff who has left a secure job,
has moved a great distance, or has otherwise suffered unusual hardship in order to accept
new employment.35 Id. at 925 quoting Drzewiecke v. H & R Block, Inc., 101 Cal.Rptr. 169.
36 Id. at 925-6.
37 D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 211 (Nev. 1991).38 1d.
39 1d.
40 Parties who have entered into a contract with one another must act in good faith. Cases ate
many which have developed and upheld this principle, and among them is every case cited in
this comment, save Bigelow. Additionally, the Uniform Commercial Code serves as a strong
source governing the parties' execution of a contract. For example, U.C.C. § 1-203 is an ob-
ligation of good faith, stating, "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement." Commercial and Debtor-Credit Law: Se-
lected Statutes, 1999 ed. at 21.
4' 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1253 (Mass. 1977).
42 Id. at 1254.
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him.
43
The court held that Fortune successfully demonstrated that National Cash
Register Co. acted in bad faith.44 Although noting that the company rightfully
discharged Fortune under the governing at-will employment doctrine, the court
nevertheless believed that the employer should act in good faith toward the em-
ployee.4 5 Significantly, the court stated that an employer's acting in good faith
does not hamper the freedom and control the employer has over an at-will em-
ployee.
4 6
The court reasoned that National Cash Register Co. sought to deprive For-
tune of compensation by terminating the contractual relationship while he was
"on the brink of successfully completing the sale. 47 Consequently, the court
concluded that the company had acted in bad faith and thus breached its em-
ployment contract with Fortune.4 8 Additionally, the court stated the rule that
"in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do any-
thing which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract
there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
4 9
C. Personnel Manuals
Personnel manuals may bind the employer to contractual obligations of
employment even when the parties are at will.50 For example, in Woolley v.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1257.
41 Id. at 1255-57.
46 Id. at 1256.
47 Id. at 1257.
48 Id. See also Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974)
upon which Fortune relies. In Monge, an at-will employee alleged that her oral contract of
employment had been terminated because she refused to date her supervisor. The court held,
"In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the employer's interest in
running his business as he see fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in
maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance be-
tween the two... a termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is
motivated by bad faith or malice ... constitutes a breach of the employment contract."
49 Id. citing Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 81 F.2d 373, 377 (1 st Cir. 1936). See
also Perritt, supra note 24. Perritt discusses a decline of the implied covenant doctrine and
considers the very protection that it had offered. In this regard he states, "Juries apparently
were to be allowed to decide for themselves what constituted good faith and to decide if the
employer's actions met the standard thus derived by them. Under this approach, the implied
covenant doctrine would give employees very broad protection." Also, for the Nevada com-
ponent of the implied covenant of good faith see infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
so See Gregory Mark Munson, A Straitacket for Employment At- Will: Recognizing Breach of
Implied Contract Actions for Wrongful Demotion, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1577, 1581 (1997).
Commenting on the application of employee handbooks, Munson observes that it is an "ever-
widening source for implied contracts." Although the acceptance of personnel manuals as
implied contracts may be an increasing trend, they may, in some cases, fail to have an influ-
ence on the at-will employment doctrine. See T. Paca v. K-Mart Corp., 775 P.2d 245
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Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 51 Richard Woolley filed a complaint against his for-
mer employer alleging breach of contract: a contract effected by the express
and implied promises of the employment manual he received from his em-
ployer. Hoffman-La Roche hired Woolley as an at-will employee and shortly
thereafter gave him the personnel manual that included a provision that secured
employment to effective employees. 52 The company subsequently retained him
for more than eight years, promoted him twice, lost confidence in him, asked
him to resign, and fired him without cause. 53 It simply ignored the termination
procedures that it outlined and distributed to its workers, among whom was
Woolley.
54
The court concluded that pursuant to the reasonable expectations of the
employee, the personnel manual bound the employer to the termination proce-
dure of its employees. 55 It held that absent a clear and prominent disclaimer, an
implied promise contained in an employment manual that an employee will be
fired only for cause was enforceable against the employer even when employ'-
ment was for an indefinite term and would otherwise be terminable at will.
The court recognized that the parties' relationship was at-will which character-
istically permits the employer to discharge the employee without cause.57
However, it also recognized that the personnel manual listed specific provisions
permitting terminations for cause and noted, "Whatever Hoffmann-La Roche
may have intended, that which was read by its employees was a promise not to
fire them except for cause."
58
Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a personnel manual may
(N.M. 1989). In that case, an at-will worker filed a wrongful termination claim against K-
Mart alleging that the company's personnel manual contractually altered the at-will employ-
ment relationship. The handbook applied only to hourly wage employees and the plaintiff
worked as a salaried managerial employee. The handbook clearly expressed that K-Mart
employees were terminable at will. The court held that personnel manuals containing such
statements "do not create an implied contract altering the parties' 'at will' relationship."
51 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985).
52 Id. at 1258.53 jd.
14 Id. at 1264.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1269-70.
57 Id. at 1259 n. 2. Significantly, the personnel manual's language included the provision, "It
is the policy of Hoffman-La Roche to retain to the extent consistent with company require-
ments, the services of all employees who perform their duties efficiently and effectively."
58 Id. at 1266. See also Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 NW 2d 880,
892 (1980). In that case, the court held that "While an employer need not establish personnel
policies or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and
makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship is presumably enhanced..
. It is enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to create an envi-
ronment in which the employee believes that, whatever the personnel policies and practices,
they are established and official at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied consis-
tently and uniformly to each employee. The employer has then created a 'situation instinct
with an obligation."'
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establish a contractual obligation of continued employment. 59 Specifically, the
court has stated, "The relationship of an employer and employee may be such
that the employer has a contractual obligation not to discharge the employee
without first abiding by conditions relating to dismissal which are either ex-
pressly agreed upon by the parties or inferable from the dealings and practices
of the parties." 6  Thus in Nevada, a personnel manual may form part of the
contract.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
Contract theory may provide remedial avenues to a wrongfully discharged
worker in an at-will employment relationship, but an increasingly popular alter-
native exists: the public policy exception. Holding that a typical at-will em-
ployment relationship grants the employer an absolute right to dismiss an em-
ployee, courts have added that an employer cannot exercise that right if its
execution would offend public policy. This theory allows an employee to re-
cover in tort when the employee's termination violates a known public policy
and requires that the plaintiff prove the following elements:
a. The existence of a clear public policy;
b. The termination in the context of the plaintiff would offend public pol-
icy;
c. The motivation for terminating the employee relates to the public policy;
and
d. The emplo er lacked "overriding legitimate business justification" to
terminate.
These criteria provide the means to exercise some power against abuse
of the at-will doctrine. Application of these criteria requires specific circum-
stances in which public policy violations occur. These specific circumstances
are:
1. discharges for refusing to violate criminal or civil laws;
6 3
59 D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 209 (Nev. 1991).
60 Id.
61 Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984), K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364
(Nev. 1987), D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1991), and Bigelow v. Bullard, 901
P.2d 630 (Nev. 1995). Many courts nation-wide hold that the at-will doctrine cannot protect
the employer when the termination of the worker offends public policy, but these Nevada
cases most appropriately fall within the scope of this comment.
62 See Perritt, supra note 24 at 398-99. See also Pugh, supra note 28; Fortune, supra note
42. In both of these cases, the plaintiffs ultimately showed that their employers lacked, "over-
riding legitimate business justification to terminate" them.
63 Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 685 (Cal. 1992). The California Court in Gantt recog-
nized, "A review of the pertinent case law in California and elsewhere ... reveals that few
courts have recognized a public policy claim absent a statute or constitutional provision evi-
dencing the policy in question." Among those cases contributing to the Gantt court's catego-
ries are Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, and Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373.
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2. discharges for having performed civic duties or statutory obligations;
64
3. discharges for asserting statutory or constitutional rights or privileges;
65
4. discharges for socially desirable performances not required by law;66 and
5. discharges for what are recognized as socially reprehensible reasons.67
An early example of the public policy exception stemmed from a plaintiff
who found himself within the first of the five circumstances listed above. Peter
Petermann followed the four-step criteria aainst his former employer to prove
that his termination violated public policy. Petermann worked as a business
agent for the union International Brotherhood of Teamsters which instructed• • 69
him to testify falsely in front of a legislative committee. The union instructed
Petermann that if he failed to provide the false testimony, it would terminate his
employment.
70
The court noted that the at-will doctrine governed in the absence of fixed
employment terms, thereby rendering it terminable by any party for any reason
whatsoever; but further noted, that an at-will employment contract may have
statutory or public policy limitations.7 1 The court found that the Penal Code §
118 dictates the unlawfulness of perjury and held, "The public policy of this
state as reflected in the penal code sections referred to above would be seriously
impaired if it were to be held that one could be discharged by reason of his re-
fusal to commit perjury.... The public policy of this state requires that every
impediment, however remote to the above objective, must be struck down when
encountered."7 2  Reacting to his termination for refusing to violate a law, Pe-
termann successfully executed an action against the union.
73
6 id.
65 Id.
66 id.
67 Id. Peck, Cornelius J.. Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Develop-
ment of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 744 (1991). See also, su-
pra note 19, at 1491 ("Although the employment at will doctrine was once an impenetrable
sheath, courts have pierced it with many holes. Public policy exceptions, breach of an im-
plied in fact contract, implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, the increased use of
the law of defamation in the workplace, and the creation of contractual rights in employment
manuals are some of the theories the courts have used to avoid unfair application of the em-
ployment at will doctrine").
68 Petermann v. Teamsters Local, 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal.App.1959). See also Tameny v. At-
lantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (1980). Tameny reflects the facts of Petermann insofar
as the employer terminated the plaintiffs employment, because the plaintiff refused to en-
gage in illegal or criminal activity.
69 Id. at 26.
7 Id. at 28.
I' d. at 27.
72 id.
73 Id. at 28. See also Bud F. Barela v. C.R. England & Sons, Inc., 197 F.3d 1313 (1999). The
elements of a prima facie case of wrongful termination in violation of public policy are: 1)
the employer terminated the worker; 2) a clear and substantial public policy existed; 3) the
employee's conduct brought the policy into play; and 4) the discharge and the conduct bring-
ing the policy into play are causally connected.
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The successful application of the public policy exception in Petermann in-
vited further consideration of a public policy definition.74 In Gantt v. Sentry
Insurance,75 the court confronted the difficulty of defining it. In that case, Vin-
cent Gantt filed an action against Sentry Insurance for terminating him in viola-
tion ofpublic policy, for which a jury rendered a verdict of $1.34 million in his
favor. The facts reveal that Gantt had agreed to testify truthfully to the De-
partment of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) re~arding the company's
sexual discrimination against a former fellow-employee.
The court determined that Sentry Insurance had constructively discharged
Gantt, because of his refusal to testify dishonestly or not to testify at all to the
DFEH.78 The court found that the company's actions against Gantt violated
public policy, but refused to define the public policy. 79 Instead, the court relied
on varied sources to identify the public policy that Sentry Insurance violated.
8 0
These sources include legislation, administrative rules, regulations, decisions,
judicial decisions, constitutional schemes, statutory schemes, the constant prac-
tice of government officials, and professional codes of ethics.
81
Significantly, the court noted that public policy claims must have some link
to statutory or constitutional provisions, and absent that link, a court would very
likely refuse to recognize the existence of a public policy at issue. 82 The court
reasoned that although Sentry Insurance did not discriminate against Gantt on
account of his sex within the meaning of the constitutional provision, "there is
nevertheless direct statutory support for the jury's express finding that Sentry
violated a fundamental public policy when it constructively discharged [the]
plaintiff...83
74 Id. at 27. The court tackled the meaning of public policy by considering several precedent
decisions. Specifically, the court stated, 'The term 'public policy' is inherently not subject to
precise definition.'.... 'Public policy is a vague expression, and few cases can arise in which
its application may not be disputed." The court adds, quoting from Mr. Story, in his work on
Contracts (section 546), "'By 'public policy' [it] is intended that principle of law which holds
that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or
against the public good.. ."'
" 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992).
76 Id. at 682-3.
77 Id. at 683.
78 id.
79 Id. at 688. The court held that Sentry Insurance violated public policy "expressed in [the]
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) provision specifically enjoining obstruction of
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) investigation when it constructively
discharged [the] district sales manager..80 Id. at 685.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 684. The court recognized four categories where employment discharge may consti-
tute a violation of public policy. These categories are: 1) refusing to commit unlawful acts; 2)
exercising statutory rights; 3) performing public functions; or 4) reporting an employer's
unlawful conduct.
83 Id. at 688. See also McGinley, supra note 19 at 1494, "No court has defined public policy
so broadly. In fact, many of the states recognizing the public policy exception have defined
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The courts continue to follow Petermann today, and among them is the Ne-
vada State Supreme Court. In 1984, the state decided Hansen v. Harrah's 84
and applied the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.
85
The plaintiff, Edward Hansen worked as a video pinball repairman, injured
himself while working, and filed a workers' compensation claim.86 Harrah's
retaliated against his filing of the claim by terminating his employment.
87
The court held that an employer's retaliatory discharge, stemming from an
injured employee's filing of a workmen's compensation claim, is actionable in88...
tort. The court concluded that an employer violates public policy when it dis-
charges an injured worker for having filed a workmen's compensation claim. 89
The court reasoned that an employee's consequential fear of being discharged
would have a "deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right."90 That is,
an employee would not file a claim to preserve his or her employment, thereby
relieving the employer of its obligation.
9 1
Significantly, the Nevada court confronted a problem that Petermann and
the upcoming Gantt had not addressed. The California courts stated that the
public policy exception aplies only when public policy has roots in statutory or
constitutional enactments. However, the Hansen court confronted a public
policy violation without the precedent support of legislative measures; that is,
Nevada had not yet adopted the public policy exception of retaliatory dis-
charge.93  Nevertheless, the court noted, "... the failure of the legislature to
enact a statute expressly forbidding retaliatory discharge for filing workmen's
compensation claims does not preclude this Court from providing a remedy for
what we conclude to be tortious behavior."
94
public policy very narrowly. According to these courts, public policy is embodied only in
legislative enactments. An employer does not violate public policy by firing an employee
unless he demands that the employee violate the law in order to keep his job."
14 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984).85 Id. at 397.
86 Id. at 395.
87 [d.
88 Id. at 394.
89 id.
90 Id. at 396.
91 Id.
92 The Gantt court noted, "A public policy exception carefully tethered to fundamental poli-
cies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions strikes the proper balance
among the interest of employers, employees and the public. The employer is bound, at a
minimum, to know the fundamental public policies of the state and nation as expressed in
their constitutions and statutes; so limited, the public policy exception presents no impedi-
ment to employers that operate within the bounds of law" 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992).
93 Hansen at 396.
94 Id. at 396-97. Significantly, the Nevada court suggested, and consequently defined, the
public policy pertaining to insurance filing. The court stated, "It would not only frustrate the
statutory scheme, but also provide employers with an inequitable advantage if they were able
to intimidate employees with the loss of their jobs upon the filing of claims for insurance
benefits as a result of industrial injuries."
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Additionally, in 1987 Nevada decided K Mart v. Ponsock and expanded the
public policy exception to include the tort of an employer's bad faith termina-
tion of its worker. George J. Ponsock worked as an employee for K Mart for
ten years. 96 The company regarded him as an excellent employee, increased his
wages to $9.40 per hour, and fired him just six months prior to his vesting all of
his retirement benefits. 97 K Mart discharged him for having painted a battery
cover on a forklift in an attempt to repair the battery.98 The company told him
to clean off the paint, report to the personnel office, and accept his final
check.99 The termination stunned Ponsock and presented him with no opportu-
nity to explain his actions.100 Of particular note, the consequences to Ponsock
included loss of pension, a long period of unemployment, several short and
part-time jobs, an eventual full-time $4.20 per hour job with no benefits, and
foreclosure of the family house. 
101
The court examined the power differential of the parties' relationship and
determined that K Mart had abused its superior position.102 The court likened
the parties' relationship to one of insurer and insured to recognize the bad faith
tort in these specific facts. 103 The analogy to insurance parties implies the spe-
cial relationship that can exist between the employer and employee: a relation-. 104
ship requiring special protection. The court concluded, "The special rela-
tionships of trust between this employer and this employee under this contract
under this kind of abusive and arbitrary dismissal cries out for relief and for a
remedy beyond that traditionally flowing from breach of contract." 10 5 Impor-
tantly, in Hansen-like fashion, it determined that in the absence of a declared
legislative enactment it could recognize a public policy of bad faith dis-
9 732 P.2d 1364, 1369 (1987). The special relationship to which the court refers lies beyond
the at-will employment doctrine, because of the employer's grossly superior power over the
employee.
96 Id. at 1366. K Mart hired Ponsock as a tenured employee; that is, until his retirement. The
company agreed that if Ponsock's performance became deficient, it would provide assistance
and discharge him only after a series of correction notices. K Mart further agreed that it
would terminate Ponsock's employment only if it determined that his performance stayed
unacceptable.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 1d. at 1367.
100 Id.
1'Id. at 1367-68
12 Id. at 1372.
103 id.
104 Id. at 1371. Regarding Ponsock's special protection, the court asked three questions: "1)
whether there is, as in the insurance cases, such a superior-inferior power differential as to
create a "special element of reliance" resulting from the employee's reliance on the em-
ployer's credibility and the employer's promise and powerfully expectant guarantee of re-
tirement benefits?; 2) whether contract damages hold employers like K Mart accountable for
this kind of misconduct; and 3) whether contract damages, under circumstances such as
these, make an aggrieved employee whole."
'' Id. at 1372.
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charge. 106 Nevada continued to develop the public policy exception in the 1991
case, Western States v. Jones. 107 In that case, Robert Jones worked as an at-will
employee for the Western States Mining Company and operated heavy equip-
ment, which had one day broken down. The company assigned him tempo-
rary duty in the cyanide leach pit and he refused because of an open wound
from which he suffered. 109 Jones learned that the company safety manual dis-
couraged any worker with an open wound to remain near cyanide, and thus110 11
asked for reassignment. 11 The company fired him for insubordination.II
The court recognized that the Western States Mining Co. violated public
policy in its termination of Jones' employment. 1 12 The court discovered the
requisite legislative support for the public policy in the Nevada Occupational
Safety and Health Act (NOSHA) whose objective was a safe and healthy work-
ing environment for all employees. 113 Thus, the court held that the company
violated public policy when it discharged Jones for "refusing to work under
conditions unreasonably dangerous to the employee."
114
The development and application of the public policy exception in Nevada
have produced a safeguard against unjust employment discharge, but in 1995
that safeguard failed. In that year the Nevada Supreme Court decided Bigelow
v. Bullard and withheld the exception's application to protect the at-will em-
ployee Michael Bullard.
115
V. BIGELOW
The facts reveal that Bullard worked for the Bigelow Holding Company
under the supervision of Donna Dallman. 116 The company had engaged in dis-
criminatory practices to which Bullard may have been an agent. The com-
pany became sensitive to Bullard's apparent sympathy towards African-
106 Id. at 1370. Specifically, the court stated, "... we now recognize a bad faith discharge
case in this fact-specific instance of discharge by a large, nationwide employer of an em-
ployee in bad faith for the improper motive of defeating contractual retirement benefits."
107 The Nevada Supreme Court combined Western States Mineral Corp. v. Jones and
D'Angelo v. Gardner, and consequently cites the case as D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206
(Nev. 1991).
10 Id. at 213.
109Id.
110 Id.
11 Id.112 Id. at 216
113 NEV. REV. STAT. 618.015(2), NEV. REV. STAT. 618.375, NEV. REV. STAT. 618.385(1),
and NEV. REV. STAT. 618.445(1). Courts have interpreted the federal and state OSHA stat-
utes to include a right that employees may assert to refuse unsafe or unhealthy employment.
See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1. Consequently, Jones had the statutory right,
and subsequent protection, to refuse exposure to unsafe or unhealthy employment conditions.
114 Western States, 819 P.2d (Nev. 1991) at 216.
115 Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630 (Nev. 1995)
116 Id. at 632.
117 Id. at 633.
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Americans and fired him.ll8 The following excerpt from the transcript reveals
the conversation leading up to his termination:
Q: How were you terminated?
A: We had three black males came [sic] on the property. Carol Swenson radi-
oed Donna Dallman [sic] on her radio-. . . I told Carol that blacks had rights,
too. Approximately five to ten minutes passed. Donna came into the office.
Carol and Donna conversed. I don't know what they said. Donna walks up to
where I'm sitting, picks up the piece of paper that I'm writing on, and she said,
"What's your fucking problem?" I said, "I don't have a problem." She said, "I
think you do." She said, "I think you're a fucking nigger lover. Sit your God
damn ass down on the fucking stool, shut your mouth, and do your fucking
work."
Q: What happened next?
A: Then she said, "On second thought, get your fucking ass out of here. I
don't want you working for me anymore."
Q: And what was the time span between those two statements by Ms. Dallman
[sic]?
A: Not even 30 seconds.
Q: Why did you make the statement, "Blacks have rights, too"?
A: Because I knew that they were fixing to physically assault the black males
to get them off the property.
19
The court determined that the at-will doctrine controlled the parties' rela-
tionship and refused Bullard the protection of public policy, because he failed to
establish aprima facie case of tortious discharge, and consequently, dismissed
his claim. The court reasoned that Bullard's inability to establish a prima fa-
cie case was because he simply refused to object to his employer's known dis-
criminatory practices. The court, in reaching its conclusion, relied solely on the
Western States' rule. 12 1 As noted earlier, the court in Western States held that
an employee may bring a survivable claim of tortious discharge against the em-
ployer when an employer dismisses the employee in retaliation for the em-
ployee's actions which are consistent with public policy and the public good. 1
22
Significantly for the court in Bigelow, the plaintiff in Western States refused the
8 Id.
"' Id. at 632-33.
120 /d. at 631.
121 D'Angelo v. Gardener (Western States v. Jones), 819 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1991). In the wake
of Western States, the Bigelow court ruled, "The only exception to the general rule that at-
will employees can be dismissed without cause is the so-called public policy exception dis-
cussed in Western States, a case in which tort liability arose out of an employer's dismissing
an employee for refusing to follow his employer's orders to work in an area that would have
been dangerous to him."
122 Id. at 216.
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employer's demand to work in an area that would have been physically danger-
ous to him.
123
In Hansen, the court held that a retaliatory discharge by the employer
stemming from an injured employee's filing of a workmen's compensation.... 124
claim is actionable in tort. The court reasoned that if an employer penalized
an employee for filing a workmen's compensation claim, the employer would
violate public policy, because the employee's consequential fear of termination
would negatively affect a statutory right and would relieve the employer of its
obligation to the employee.
125
Based on Hansen, the court in Western States concluded that employment
termination for refusal to work in unreasonably dangerous conditions violated
public policy. 126 The court noted:
Achievement of the statutory objective-a safe and healthy working environ-
ment for all employees-requires that employees be free to call their em-
ployer's attention to such conditions, so that the employer can be made aware
of their existence, and given opportunity to correct them if correction is
needed. The public policy thus implicated extends beyond the question of fair-
ness to the particular employee; it concerns protection of employees against re-
taliatory dismissal for conduct which, in light of the statutes, deserves to be
encouraged, rather than inhibited.
27
But the court in Bigelow refused to apply the Western States rule. Rather, it
reasoned that a tortious discharge claim survives only when the employee re-
fuses to comply with an employer's demand that the employee engage in im-
proper activity.
The court's focus upon a kind of requisite expressed objection to known il-
legal activity appears inconsistent with recent cases. For example, in Liberatore
v. Melville Corp., 129 James Liberatore filed a complaint against his former em-
ployer alleging wrongful termination. He worked as a pharmacist for thirteen
years in an at-will employment relationship with People's Drug Store, which
the Melville Corporation purchased in 1990.130 In 1993, the employer relo-
cated the pharmacy inside the store to a glass-enclosed section that extended
beyond the building's exterior wall; consequently, the glass-enclosed section
affected the temperature which adversely affected certain drugs.131 Liberatore
notified his supervisor of the situation, but the employer neglected to remedy
123 Id.
124 Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984).
125 id.
126 D'Angelo, 819 P.2d at 216.
127 Id. at 216, quoting Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal.App.3d 290, 298, 188 Cal.Rptr. 159
(1982).
128 Supra note 114 at 635.
129 168 F.3d 1326 (1999). Liberatore appealed from the grant of summary judgment to the
Melville Corporation on his claim of wrongful discharge.
S0 Id. at 1328.
131 id.
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the problem. 132 Seven months later, he threatened to report the problem to the
Federal Drug Administration and about a week later, received notice of his ter-
mination.
In reversing summary judgment, the court noted that the public policy ex-
ception to the at-will employment doctrine is "not limited to cases where an at-
will employee was discharged for having outright refused to violate the law."'
34
The court recognized that the parties' relationship was at-will which nearly al-
ways permits the employer to discharge the employee without cause. 135 How-
ever, it observed that Liberatore's conduct implicated the public policy underly-
ing the legal warnings against the mishandling and inappropriate storage of
drugs.
13 6
Furthermore, the court noted that Liberatore never complained to an outside
agency, but merely internally to his supervisor. 137 In considering the conse-
quences of supporting employees who disagree to management, the court
stated, "Were the court to agree that discharges from employment in retaliation
for internal complaints of law violations are not protected by the public policy
exception, it would 'create perverse incentives by inviting concerned employees
to bypass internal channels altogether and immediately summon the police.""
3 8
Additionally, the courts have validated the employee's complaints even
when the employee has engaged in the employer's illegal activity. For exam-
ple, in Paolella v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., Michael Paolella filed a complaint
against his former employer alleging wrongful termination. 14  In 1991, the
waste disposal company reacted to the Delaware Solid Waste Authority's 25%
price increase of its landfill disposal rate by scheming to bill illegally its cli-
ents. 14 Paolella learned of his employer's illegal activity, acted in his capacity
to execute the activity, and complained about the activity to his car pool partner
on a regular basis.'
42
The court held that the public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine applies in a situation where the employee has participated in the em-
ployer's illegal activity. 143 The court stated, "Although the exceptions to the at-
will doctrine are to be narrowly drawn, the policy reasons for protecting whis-
tleblowers remain whether or not the employee can avoid involvement in the
132 Id.
133 id.
114 Id. at 1327 citing Carl v. Children's Hospital, 702 A.2d 159 (D.C. 1997).
131 Id. at 1330.
136 Id. at 1331.
137 Id.
138 Id. quoting Belline v. K Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1991).
139 Michael Paolella v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 158 F.3d 183 (3rd Cir. 1998)
141 Id. at 187-88.
141 Id. at 186.
142 id.
143 Id.
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illegal activity."' 144 Significantly, the court noted that while Paolella questioned
the propriety of Browning-Ferris' business practices he raised legal, as opposed• . ,145
to ethical concerns about his employer's conduct. Consequently, the excep-
tion applies. Furthermore, the court considered the exception's effect, stating,
"'to preclude even a penny of recovery to a whistle-blower plaintiff because
that plaintiff had some slight participation in that wrongdoing would be a disin-
centive to rooting out corruption, and would mute more than a few whis-
tles.""
146
Like the plaintiffs in Liberatore and Paolella, Bullard complained only in-
ternally about the rights of African-American tenants and participated as an
agent in his employer's illegal activity. 147 Nevertheless, the court in Bigelow
withheld application of the public policy exception because it failed to regard
Bullard's internal complaint as a expressed objection:
Bullard's protest, or, better, protestation (if, indeed it can be called that) was
pretty sickly. He apparently was not willing to make such statements in the
presence of Dallman. When Dallman asked him if he had "a problem" with the
company he was quick to deny it. If Bullard had ever "stood up" to Dallman
and said something like, "Look here, Dallman, I am sick and tired of the way
you treat Blacks around here and I am not going to put up with it any longer"
he might have had a different case.
48
The court focused on the moment when Bullard's supervisor asked him if
he had a problem, and it bases its decision on his responding "no". The court
reasoned that Western States has no application, because in that case the plain-
tiff articulated an express objection to his working in toxic conditions to his
employer. In the present case, the court found that Bullard directed his com-
ment "Blacks have rights, too" to a coworker and not to the employer directly,
specifically Dallman. However, the court failed to consider that his comment
reached management within five to ten minutes, and that his comment regis-
tered with management as evidenced by Dallman's acknowledging that Bullard
indeed has a problem. 14 9 The court failed to account for Bullard's diminutive
bargaining capacity as an employee, and it also failed to account for specific
facts revealing Bullard's inferior position.
44Id. at 191.
145 Id. at 191. Browning-Ferris Inc. contends that the public policy exception cannot apply to
Paolella because his complaints fail to address a specific public interest which has some leg-
islative, administrative, or judicial authority. However, the court will apply the exception in
cases where the employer has engaged in activity which breaks the law. Here, the company
designed a billing scheme to defraud its customers: a scheme violative of the law.
146 Id. at 188 quoting the testimony of Paolella.
147 Supra note 114 at 633.
1481 Id. at 634.
149 Id. The court noted, "It may be true that Bullard apparently felt some disapproval of the
way his employer was treating African-Americans and, in an aside, expressed his disapproval
to one of his co-workers; but this expression of disapproval was made to a coworker, and not
to the company or its management. This comment to another employee is a far cry from his
having refused to carry out directions that were violative of public policy."
[Vol. 1:249
Spring 2001] PUBLIC POLICY AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
The court assumed that the at will employment relationship empowers the
company to terminate Bullard even on a mere whim. 150 Nevertheless it failed
to account for the at will doctrine's primary premise of equal terminable power
between employer and employee. The power differential gave the company
superior bargaining capacity over Bullard that it wielded abusively. Evidence of
its perverse execution includes Dallman's approaching Bullard following his
remark to a coworker. She confronted him at his desk and not in a private place
away from other workers, grabbed the paper upon which he was writing, and
asked, "What's your fucking problem." She called him a "fucking nigger
lover," told him to sit his "God damn ass down on that fucking stool, shut your
mouth, and do your fucking work."' 53 Immediately following her instructions
to him she said, "On second thought, fet your fucking ass out of here. I don't
want you working for me anymore.
The court failed to consider the explicit superiority of the company and the
resulting inferiority of Bullard. It only reasoned that when asked "What's your
fucking problem," Bullard failed to recognize the question as his opportunity to
object to the company's known discriminatory practices. The court adds that
even if it understood his comment "Blacks have rights, too" as an objection, "it
is important to remember that the remark was not made to management and was
not made in opposition or objection to the company's supposed discriminatory
policies."' 155  The subservient context of Bullard's job suggests that he could
not have made an express objection to company management without the inevi-
table likelihood of losing his job.156
150 Id. at 633. The court noted, "When one reads the dialogue between Dallman and Bullard,
it would appear that when Dallman finally decided to dismiss Bullard, it was on the basis of
her personal dislike for him and her general dissatisfaction whith Bullard as an employee.
Even if that dissatisfaction were based (as Bullard suspects) largely upon his 'Blacks-have-
rights-too' remark to Carol Swenson, Dallman still had the perfect right to dismiss him at her
whim, for no reason or even for 'wrong' reasons, so long as she did not dismiss him for a
refusal to carry out employment tasks that were contrary to public policy or for his perform-
ing acts that were favored by public policy."
1' Id. at 634.
151 Id. at 632.
153 Id.
154 Id.
... Id. at 634.
156 In Rankin et al. v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378, the United States Supreme Court addressed
an employee's First Amendment right to free speech. In that case, McPherson, a clerical
worker for a public employer, conversed privately with her boyfriend (who was also her co-
employee) at her workplace about a report of an assassination attempt on United States
President Ronald Reagan. In response to the report, McPherson communicated to her boy-
friend, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him." Another employee overheard the re-
mark and reported it to management. Of consequence, the employer fired McPherson. The
Court held that the employer's "interest in discharging [McPherson] did not outweigh
[McPherson's] interest in exercising her First Amendment rights." Although McPherson
involved a public employer, its application to Bigelow serves as a source of public policy rec-
ognizing First Amendment protection for Bullard's remark.
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If indeed the court had found the Bigelow company's actions violated pub-
lic policy, the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine would
have given a voice to an individual whose abusive employer sought to subvert
it. Rather, the court explained that if it had expanded the exception to cover
Bullard, then "such a ruling would invite a large number of tortious discharge
claims that the employer fired the employee merely for not agreeing with com-
pany decisions or for expressing vague objections to what the employee might
have seen as untoward company policy." Importantly, however, the com-
pany policy pertaining to these specific facts is no generic company policy, but
a harmful and illegal one; that is, strong evidence suggests the company creates,
endorses, and executes policies of racial discrimination. 
158
The fear of opening a floodgate of tortious discharge claims is inconsistent
with previous Nevada Supreme Court holdings; that is, the court has not re-
served the public policy exception to specific circumstances warranting careful
consideration. 159 The present case calls for such consideration of the following
circumstances:
a) Bullard's knowledge of the company's known discriminatory activity;
b) Bullard's sitting on a stool while his supervisor, Dallman, was standing;
c) Dallman's grabbing the piece of paper upon which Bullard was writing;
d) Dallman's asking Bullard, "What's your fucking problem;"
e) Dallman's calling Bullard a "fucking nigger" lover;
f) Dallman's ordering Bullard, "Sit your God damn ass down on that fuck-
ing stool;"
g) Dallman's ordering Bullard to shut his mouth;
h) Dallman's ordering Bullard, "Do your fucking work;"
i) Bullard's knowledge that the employer intended to inflict physical vio-
lence upon the three African-American males; and
j) the thirty seconds in which the exchange took place.
Bullard knew of his employer's discriminatory practices and intention to
assault three African-American males. An inference of his apprehension to ob-
ject expressly or didactically to these actions is reasonable. His comment
served as an objection to his employer's intention of placing the lives of the
three males in danger and as an objection to his employer's allegedly known
discriminatory practices: an objection worthy of Western States' application of
1' Bigelow, 901 P.2d at 635.
158 Id. at 632. Commenting on the company's harmful policies, the court stated, "There is
strong evidence that Bigelow, as a company, was engaging in racially-discriminatory prac-
tices ..."
159 See K Mart v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Nev. 1987). The court held that, "The spe-
cial relationship of trust between this employer and this employee under this contract under
this kind of abusive and arbitrary dismissal cries out for relief and for a remedy beyond that
traditionally flowing from breach of contract. To permit only contract damages as the sole
remedy for this kind of conduct would be to render K Mart totally unaccountable for these
kinds of actions."
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the public policy exception.
160
The court in Bigelow contends that in order for Bullard to have a cause of
action for tortious discharge, the company must terminate his employment for
his having affirmatively acted in a manner consistent with public policy sug-
gesting that objecting to company actions violative of public policy would war-
rant the exception's application. However, where the wrongfully discharged
worker struggles to implicate a clear standing public policy, such as objecting to
an employer's actions violative of public policy, courts have been willing to
bridge the gap with strong public policy support.
62
Courts have had to infer the implicated public policy in the absence of ex-
pressly statutorily violative behavior. For example, in one of the final cases of
the twentieth century, the Tenth Circuit U. S. Court of Appeals reviewed de
novo a wrongful termination claim in violation of public policy. 163 In Barela v.
C.R. England, the employee learned of the company's miscalculated salaries
and wages it promised its new truck drivers. 164 Barela calculated that the pro-
jected earnings mandated an illegal number of driving hours and induced
fraudulent behavior. 16 5 The supervisor instructed Barela not to answer new
employees' questions about pay, criticized him for undermining the company's
goals, and three weeks later terminated his employment.
166
The court recognized that the at-will doctrine governed the parties' em-
ployment relationship, but noted that the public policy exception could over-
come it. 167 The court's analysis focused on the plaintiffs establishing a prima
facie case of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 16 Specifically,
the analysis required that the Barela show that 1) the company discharged him;
2) a clear and substantial public policy existed; 3) his conduct brought the pol-
icy into play; and 4) the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play
are causally connected. 
169
The court found that Barela satisfied the first two elements easily, but de-
termined that it needed to inspect more closely the third element's satisfac-
160 See Rankin, supra 157.
161 Bigelow, 901 P.2d at 634.
162 See Perritt, supra note 26 at 398-99. As noted earlier, establishing a prima facie case gen-
erally requires Bullard's satisfaction of the following elements:
a. The existence of a clear public policy;
b. The termination in the context of the plaintiff would offend public policy;
c. The motivation for terminating the employee relates to the public policy; and
d. The employer lacked "overriding legitimate business justification" to terminate.
163 197 F.3d 1313 (1999).
164 Id. at 1314.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1315 citing Ryan v. Dan's Foods Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 400 (Utah 1998).
168 Id. at 1316. See also Perrit, supra note 24.
169 Id.
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tion. 170 The third element requires his showing that his conduct brought a pub-
lic policy into play. 17 1 The court found that Barela's conduct implicated only
the private interests of the company, but found that such internal reporting alone
suffices to bring a public policy into play. 172 Consequently, the court deter-
mined that Barela's conduct "implicated policies that indisputably affect the
public interest: promoting safe roads and deterring fraud."
173
Similarly, Bullard's conduct implicates public policy based upon a number
of sources. However, one need consider the discriminatory context in which
Bullard made his remark when regarding the sources of public policy. The
Bigelow Company is a large company whose holdings include apartment com-
plexes and other rental properties. The court recognized that there was strong
evidence suggesting the company discriminated against African-Americans and
added, "It has been claimed that the agents of Bigelow were instructed to use
deception and subterfuge to prevent African-Americans from becoming tenants
in Bigelow rentals."' 174 Furthermore, (and specific to his comment, "Blacks
have rights, too") Bullard understood that the company intended to assault
physically three African-American males on one of Bigelow's properties.
175
The discriminatory context provides a foreground for Bullard's comment
"Blacks have rights, too." Furthermore, his comment would likely attract fa-
vorable public support and his consequent termination would likely attract con-
siderable public disapproval.
A possible source of the public policy favoring Bullard's remark is the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.176 It provided, "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop-177 ...
erty. Additionally supportive public policy is the consequential ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.179
Furthermore, public policy sustaining Bullard's remark stems from the
speech protection of the First Amendment. 179 Traditionally this constitutional
171 Id. at 1317.
171 id.
172 id.
173 Id. at 1318. The court ultimately found that Barela satisfied the first three elements of the
prima facie case, but remanded the case for the district court to determine whether Barela can
establish the causal connection between his discharge and his conduct.
17' Bigelow, 901 P.2d at 633.
175 id.
176 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees African-Americans
the same rights to contract as Caucasian Americans. Congress made this provision a part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and amended the provision in 1991 when it amended Title VII.
177 Id.
178 The Fourteenth Amendment provides,".., nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person wkhin its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
179 The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech..." Although First Amendment speech protection applies generally to public em-
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protection extended only to the public workplace. However, in Novesel v. Na-
tionwide Ins. Co., 18 the Third Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
provided First Amendment protection to a private employee. 18 1 The court ex-
pressed the greater value of the free speech right over the tradition of the private
workplace:
[These] cases suggest that an important public policy is in fact implicated
wherever the power to hire and fire is utilized to dictate terms of employee po-
litical activities. In dealing with public employees, the cause of action arises
directly from the Constitution rather than from common law developments.
The protection of important political freedoms, however, goes well beyond the
question whether the threat comes from state or private bodies."8 2
Another is the public policy source of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000. The Act focuses on discouraging and eradicating discrimination
in the workplace. The Act provides that an employer's discrimination is unlaw-
ful against any individual with respect to his or her "compensation, terms, con-
ditions, privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, re-,. . .. , • • ,,183
ligion, sex, or national ongin. Although the African-Americans who were
the subject of Bullard's comment were not employees of Bigelow, the retalia-
tion provision of Title VII discourages Bigelow's action against Bullard be-
cause of them. 
184
Furthermore, the congressional charge to employers not to discriminate in
the workplace could extend to a public policy of simply discouraging discrimi-
nation against a person, "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 18 5 Or rather, it could extend to a public policy favoring an
employee's objecting to an employer's known discriminatory practices.
Additionally, the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619, 3631
(1994), which Congress originally enacted in 1968, is a source of public policy.
ployers only, Lisa Bingham comments on its application to private employers, such as Bige-
low. She states, "There is a substantial argument that state action triggers constitutional pro-
tections when a state court rejects an employee's claim that a private employer fired him or
here in violation of the public policy embodied in the First Amendment. The essence of this
argument is that the state court's decision itself provides the requisite government involve-
ment. Although private parties are not otherwise bound by constitutional protections, the
judiciary may not countenance the deprivation." Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in
the Workplace: Using the First Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Ac-
tions, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 341, 362 (1994).
180 Novesel v. Nationwide Ins. Co. 721 F.2d 894 (1983).
181 id.
182 Id. at 900.
183 § 703(a) of Title VII.
184 Id. The provision provides "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.
. to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against
any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice, made
an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, as-
sisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
title."
185 id.
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In short, the Act prohibits discriminatory practices in the sale or rental of prop-
erty.
186
Nevertheless, the Bigelow court found no applicable public policy excep-
tion to the at-will employment doctrine. 187 However, in the workmen's com-
pensation case Hansen v. Harrah 's, the Nevada Supreme Court previously held
that, "the at-will employment rule is subject to limited exceptions founded upon
strong public policy; and the failure of the legislature to enact a statute ex-
pressly forbidding retaliatory discharge for filing workmen's compensation
claims does not preclude this Court from providing a remedy for what we con-
clude to be tortious behavior."' 188 Thus, Hansen suggests that the court could
fashion an appropriate remedy even in the absence of anti-discriminatory stat-
utes if public policy were sufficiently strong:
For at root, the public policy exception rests on the recognition that in a civi-
lized society the rights of each person are necessarily limited by the rights of
others and of the public at large; this the delicate balance which holds such so-
cieties together. Accordingly, while an at-will employee may be terminated for
no reason, there can be no right to terminate for an unlawful reason or a pur-
pose that contravenes fundamental public policy. 89
Although public policy strongly disfavors unlawful discrimination, the
Bigelow court found that it could not include Bullard's employment termina-
tion.190 It reasoned that the Bigelow company rightfully dismissed him as an at
will employee, because his termination was not for "a refusal to carry out em-
ployment tasks that were contrary to public policy or for his performing acts
that were favored by public policy."' 9  The company simply never asked Bul-
lard to execute any of its known discriminatory policies, but it discharged him
18 6 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
187 Bigelow, 901 P.2d at 635. The court concluded, "In sum, then, we do not deem it to be
consistent with the employment law of this state to hold that an employee's merely express-
ing to a fellow employee or some third person disapproval of or 'objection' to company pol-
icy (as distinguished from refusal to carry out that policy can be the predicate for a tortious
discharge action)."
188 675 P.2d 394, 396 (Nev. 1984). Significantly, Hansen is the central case in Western
States which is the central case for Bigelow.
189 Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680,687 (Cal. 1992).
190 Supra note 114 at 633.
191 Id.
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as a result of his commenting on them.
The Nevada Supreme Court's refusal to apply the public policy exception
to these specific facts surrounding Michael Bullard is harmful to workers. Hold-
ing that employees must express an objection to a company's violative policies
and practices compels employees to risk losing their employment. It disregards
the power structure of employment and forces the employees to stand up
against those who issue their paychecks. Thus, employees may lose incentive
to express any objections because of fear of losing their jobs. The result silences
employees' voices, empowers unreasonably the employer, and breaks down the
safeguard against abuse of the at-will employment doctrine. The comment,
"Blacks have rights, too" should have place in American society without fear
that its utterance will lead to employment termination.
